Individual Rights Versus Collective Security: Assessing The Constitutionality Of The USA Patriot Act by Gonzalez, Tracey Topper
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami International and Comparative Law Review
10-1-2003
Individual Rights Versus Collective Security:
Assessing The Constitutionality Of The USA
Patriot Act
Tracey Topper Gonzalez
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umiclr
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami
International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact
library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
Tracey Topper Gonzalez, Individual Rights Versus Collective Security: Assessing The Constitutionality Of The USA Patriot Act, 11 U. Miami
Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 75 (2003)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umiclr/vol11/iss2/3
Individual Rights Versus Collective Security:
Assessing the Constitutionality of the USA Patriot Act
Tracey Topper Gonzalez*
I. Introduction
[T]he gravest danger terrorism poses is the risk that democratic
societies will overestimate the magnitude of the threat and
authorize measures violating fundamental norms of human
rights and threatening the democratic principles we hold so
dear.'
[W]hile the Constitution protects against invasions of individual
rights, it is not a suicide pact.
2
The most devastating terrorist attacks in United States history
took place on September 11, 2001.3 Less than two months later,
Congress responded by passing a comprehensive anti-terrorism measure,
awkwardly titled the "Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
* J.D., 2003, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law; B.A., 1993, Pennsylvania
State University. The author has accepted a clerkship with the Honorable
Richard K. Eaton at the United States Court of International Trade in New York
for the 2003-2005 term.
1 Michael A. Grimaldi, Human Rights v. New Initiatives in the Control of
Terrorism, 79 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 288, 296 (1985) (remarks of John F.
Murphy).
2 Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 159-60 (1963) (discussing the
draft as one of the obligations of U.S. citizenship).
3 Nineteen men linked to Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda terrorist network
hijacked four airplanes, crashing two of the planes into the Twin Towers of the
World Trade Center in New York, and one of the planes into the Pentagon
outside of Washington, D.C. A fourth hijacked plane, believed to have been
thrown off its intended target by the intervention of the passengers, crashed in a
field in Pennsylvania. In the Twin Towers alone, over 3,000 people were killed.
See generally Michael Grunwald, Terrorists Hijack 4 Airliners; 2 Destroy World
Trade Center, I Hits Pentagon, 4th Crashes; Hundreds Dead; Bush Promises
Retribution; Military Put on Highest Alert, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 2001, at A1,
2001 WL 27731754 (reporting the events of September 11, 2001).
U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of
2001," so as to form the acronym "U.S.A. P.A.T.R.I.O.T. Act."
4
Characterized as the bill with the "long name, and longer
reach,"5 the Act quickly became a target for critics, who warned of its
"relentless assault on civil liberties" 6 and Orwellian 7 tactics. Supporters
of the bill, however-including, it seemed, a commanding majority of
the American public--hailed the measure as justified, "because terrorists
'are trying to kill Americans-as many as they possibly can. ' '
This article examines two of the most controversial provisions of
the USA Patriot Act: first, the Attorney General's expanded powers to
detain, deport, or deny admission to suspect aliens attempting to enter the
United States; and second, the government's broadened authority to
conduct confidential searches of suspected terrorists' homes ° and to
intercept and monitor suspects' telephone and Internet communications.
Both provisions expand government authority under previously existing
law. 11
4 Pub. L. No. 107-56 (2001) (hereinafter "the USA Patriot Act" or "the Act").
The Act took effect on October 26, 2001.
5 Matthew Purdy, Bush's New Rules to Fight Terror Transform the Legal
Landscape, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2001, at Al.
6 George Lardner Jr., On Left and Right, Concern Over Anti-Terrorism Moves:
Administration Actions Threaten Civil Liberties, Critics Say, WASH. POST, Nov.
16, 2001, at A40.
7 See GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1948). In the book, Orwell describes a
totalitarian society led by "Big Brother," which censors everyone's behavior.
Today, the term "Orwellian" refers to intrusive governmental regulation of
rrivate behavior.
A Gallup survey conducted in late 2001 showed that 82% of Americans
favored increased government power to detain even legal immigrants. Adam
Cohen, Fighting Terror at Home, TIME, Dec. 10, 2001, at 30, 2001 WL
29385648.
9 Id. (quoting Sen. Orrin Hatch, R-Utah).
'0 This particular provision applies to both noncitizen aliens and citizens, which
is one reason why it is controversial.
"1 The attorney general's expanded powers over immigration stem from the Anti-
Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132 (1996), and the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 104-
208 (1996). The government's broadened surveillance powers under the USA
Patriot Act originate in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Pub. L. No.
95-511 (1978) (codified in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.).
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The discussion begins with an historical overview of national
security in the United States, tracing the sources of executive and
legislative power from the earliest days of the republic through the
passage of the USA Patriot Act in October 2001. An overview of
immigration in the United States follows, with particular emphasis on
Congress's plenary power to regulate immigration and the judiciary's
traditional deference to such power.
Next, this article explores the Attorney General's broadened
authority over immigration pursuant to the USA Patriot Act, concluding
that the Attorney General's newly delegated powers fall well within the
legislative branch's plenary power over immigration, and therefore pass
constitutional muster.
Finally, this article finds ample support for the constitutionality
of the government's broadened search and surveillance powers under the
USA Patriot Act. The legislative branch historically has taken the lead in
authorizing investigation of national security matters, and the judiciary
has granted Congress special deference in its efforts to balance national
security concerns against any intrusion on constitutionally protected
privacy interests.12 The USA Patriot Act expands these powers only
incrementally, and they remain within the constitutional bounds
established by Congress and sanctioned by the courts.
II. Background
A. Historical Overview: National Security in the United
States
"[F]rom the earliest days of the Republic," the United States
government has recognized the need for national security. 3 In 1775,
"the Continental Congress created the Committee for Secret
Correspondence, thus authorizing the first official intelligence activity.
' 14
The first legislation "made it a capital offense for all persons, not
12 See Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 263-4 (1979) ("It is appropriate to
accord special deference to Congress whenever it has expressly balanced the
need for a new investigatory technique against the undesirable consequences of
any intrusion on constitutionally protected interests in privacy." (citing Marshall
v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 334-39 (1978))).
13 See William C. Banks & M.E. Bowman, Executive Authority for National
Security Surveillance, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 18 (2000).
"4 See id. at 10-11.
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members of, nor owing allegiance to any of the United States of America
... [to be] found lurking as spies."' 
5
Most early presidents, following the model set by Washington,
assumed the authority to engage agents for intelligence matters.
1 6
Congress typically was happy to oblige, and for the most part
intelligence remained a purely executive matter, with each successive
president doing what he felt necessary to gain information and keep the
nation secure. 7
Over the next century, "presidential exercise of executive
authority continued to shape national security law.'1 8 The Espionage
Act, enacted on June 15, 1917, authorized the government to wiretap,
search and seize private property, censure writings, open mail, and
restrict the right of assembly.'9 At the time, such measures were deemed
necessary to thwart German hegemonic designs on the United States
20
Eventually, the executive began to delegate responsibility for
homeland security, beginning with J. Edgar Hoover's appointment as
Director of the FBI in 1924.21 Authority was later vested in the
Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency as well.
22
Beginning in 1940, President Roosevelt authorized the Attorney General
to approve electronic surveillance for "grave matters involving defense
of the nation." 23 It was requested that the Attorney General keep such
investigations to a minimum, and to limit them as much as possible to
15 Id at 12 (citing 6 J. CONTINENTAL CONG. 1774 - 1789, at 345 (Worthington C.
Ford et al. eds., 1905)).
16 See generally Edward F. Sayle, The Historical Underpinnings of the U.S.
Intelligence Community, I INT'L J. INTEL. & COUNTERINTEL. 1 (1986). "No
president of the nineteenth century matched Washington's flair for intelligence,"
however. Banks & Bowman, supra note 13, at 15.
17 See Sayle, supra note 16, at 15. The President's power over foreign affairs is
found in Article II, section 2 of the Constitution.
18 See Banks & Bowman, supra note 13, at 19.
'9 G.J.A. O'TOOLE, HONORABLE TREACHERY: A HISTORY OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE,
ESPIONAGE, AND COVERT ACTION FROM THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION TO THE
CIA 272-73 (1991).
20 Id. at 202, 272-3. These plans included invasion of New York and Cape Cod.
Id. at 204.
21 See Banks & Bowman, supra note 13, at 26.
22 See O'TOOLE, supra note 19, at 431.
23 See S. REP. No. 95-604, at 10 (1977). The "grave matters" that Roosevelt
contemplated included the activities of "subversives," most likely Communists.
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aliens. 24  A decade later, at the height of the "red scare," the now-
infamous House Un-American Affairs Committee and the Smith Acf
5
emerged, and the nation once again demonstrated a willingness to accept
extraordinary measures to ensure national security.
26
After the decline of McCarthyism, Americans' reception to
extraordinary national security measures was somewhat less hospitable.
In the 1960s and 1970s, the nation became incensed at revelations that
the CIA was meddling in domestic affairs,27 and that the FBI was running
programs such as "COINTELPRO. ' 28 The Civil Rights era had begun,
and it would take the September 11 attacks-the worst ever perpetrated
on U.S. soil-for the nation to regain its focus on national security.
B. The 1990s: The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Ace 9 and the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act
3°
Historically, threats to America's national security have
originated outside the nation's borders: the British and French in the
early years of the republic; the Germans during the First and Second
World Wars; Soviet communism from the 1950s through the 1980s; and
predominantly fundamentalist Muslim terrorism (aimed primarily at U.S.
interests overseas until very recently), from the 1990s to the present.
Yet, in recent years, mass legal immigration3' and lax enforcement of
24 See S. REP. No. 95-604, at 10 (1977).
25 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (2003).
26 See ERNEST VOLKMAN & BLAINE BAGGETr, SECRET INTELLIGENCE: THE
INSIDE STORY OF AMERICA'S ESPIONAGE EMPIRE 90-92 (1989).
27 See, e.g., Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 196 (1977).
28 See, e.g., Frank Wilkinson, Revisiting the "McCarthy Era": Looking at
Wilkinson v. United States in Light of Wilkinson v. F.B.I., 33 LOY. L.A. L. REv.
681, 683 (2000). Short for "counterintelligence programs," these covert FBI
programs were directed against domestic groups such as the United States
Communist Party, the Socialist Labor Party, and the Ku Klux Klan. Id. at 683
n.6.29 Pub. L. No. 104-132 (1996) (codified at 28 USC §§ 2244-2266 (1996)).
0 Pub. L. No. 104-208 (1996) (codified at various sections of 8 U.S.C.).
31 From 1900 through 1930, a period commonly referred to as the "Great Wave
of Immigration," an average of 15.6 million immigrants were admitted per
decade, for a total of 47 million over a period of 30 years. By contrast, in just
ten years, from 1990 through 2000, 32.7 million immigrants were admitted-
more than double the per-decade numbers of the Great Wave. See
http://www.numbersusa.com/overpopulation/decadegraph.html. Although
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illegal immigration32 have left the United States increasingly vulnerable
to attack by its enemies from within.33 As Mary Jo White, former U.S.
Attorney for the Southern District of New York,34 has explained,
"Immigration made this country what it is, and we never want to lose
that. But we have to get greater control over [aliens]. It is a critical
national security issue.' ' 5
Responding in part to Americans' fears stemming from the 1993
terrorist bombing of the World Trade Center,36 Congress passed the Anti-
immigration rates have decreased slightly (incoming immigrants in 1930
equaled 12.7% of the total U.S. population in that year; incoming immigrants in
2000 equaled 11.6% of the population in that year), the effects of mass
immigration today, with the U.S population at all-time high, are well
documented. See, e.g., Colorado Alliance for Immigration Reform, at
www.cairco.org/edu/education.html (detailing negative effects on education,
energy, and the economy as a result of mass immigration); see also Oregonians
for Immigration Reform, at www.oregonir.org (advocating environmentally
responsible levels of immigration).
32 It has always been illegal to overstay a visa or sneak into the United States.
But with over eight million illegal immigrants in the population, and more
arriving every day, authorities have been hard-pressed to track down more than a
small handful of violators. See Tamar Lewin, As Authorities Keep Up
Immigration Arrests, Detainees Ask Why They Are Targets, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3,
2002, at A14.
33 Internal threats to United States are not unique to the twenty-first century.
During the Red Scare, for example, Congressmen called on their constituents to
hunt down "internal enemies," considered at that time to be Communist
subversives intent on toppling the American government. See Banks &
Bowman, supra note 13, at 29.
34 New York's Southern District includes Manhattan, the site of the World Trade
Center attacks.
35 John Caher, White Reflects on Prosecuting Terror Crimes, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 25,
2002, at 1.
36 The bombing occurred on February 26, 1993. Six people were killed and
many more injured. The mastermind of the plot, Ramzi Yousef, had entered the
United States illegally and was not detained pending an asylum hearing. See
Laurie Mylroie, The World Trade Center Bomb: Who is Ramzi Youse]? And Why
it Matters, THE NAT'L INT. (Winter 1995/96), available at
www.fas.org/irp/world/iraq/956-tni.htm. Yousef was arrested in Pakistan two
years after the bombing and extradited to the United States. He was convicted
by a jury in 1996 and sentenced to life in prison. United States v. Yousef, 1999
WL 714103 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
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Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") in 1996."7 The
legislature's fears were apparently well founded. A United States
Department of State survey released in April 1996 (the same month the
AEDPA was enacted) found that international terrorist acts increased by
more than one-third in 1995.38 One-fourth of the acts were aimed at the
United States or its citizens.
39
Intended to expel those aliens who pose a threat to America's
national security, the AEDPA provides for retroactive and prospective
deportation of terrorist aliens. Though widely criticized4 ° for its
significant restriction of the right of habeas corpus for certain deportable
aliens, several circuit courts have found the AEDPA's removal of
judicial review for deportation decisions to be constitutional,I and the
Supreme Court has never granted certiorari on this issue. Ambiguities
remain, however, regarding aliens' right to due process and other
constitutional protections, and this article will explore those rights in a
discussion of the Attorney General's expanded powers with regard to
suspect aliens, infra.
Passed shortly after the AEDPA, the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act ("IIRIRA")42 retroactively rendered
permanent residents with criminal records deportable, and precluded
courts of appeals43 from exercising jurisdiction to review a final removal
order 44 against any person deported under such circumstances. The
37 Pub. L. No. 104-132 (1996) (codified at 28 USC §§ 2244-2266 (1996)).
38 Susan Dente Ross, In the Shadow of Terror: The Illusive First Amendment
Rights ofAliens, 6 COMM. L. & POL'Y 75, 81 (2001).39 Id
40 See, e.g., Lisa C. Solbakken, The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act: Anti-Immigration Legislation Veiled in an Anti-Terrorism Pretext, 63
BROOK. L. REV. 1381 (1997).
41 See id. at 1409 (1997) (citing, e.g., Kolster v. INS, 101 F.3d 785 (1st Cir.
1996); Mendez-Rosas v. INS, 87 F.3d 672 (5th Cir. 1996)).
42 Pub. L. No. 104-208 (1996) (codified at various sections of 8 U.S.C.).
43 With respect to district courts, Congress has not spoken with sufficient clarity
to strip them of their jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions regarding final removal
orders. See generally INS v. St. Cyr, 531 U.S. 1107 (2001).
44 Deportation is now referred to as "removal." See generally AEDPA, Pub. L.
No. 104-132 (1996). Since older statutes cited in this article refer to the process
as deportation, not removal, the terms are used interchangeably here.
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IIRIRA also greatly expanded the class of crimes that constitute an
aggravated felony, including terrorism.4"
C. Post-September 11: The USA Patriot Act
The USA Patriot Act was passed in direct response to the terror
attacks on September 11. 4 6  The measure passed by overwhelming
majorities in both houses, by a vote of 356 to I in the House and 98 to 1
in the Senate.
47
Outrage at the attacks was a major impetus behind passage of the
Act. Described by some as a "sleeping giant," whose citizens "liv[e] in
blithe ignorance of the world around them," 8 the United States was
shocked and horrified by the attacks, to be sure, but the primary emotion
of most citizens, including members of Congress, was pure outrage 49
Much of this anger stemmed from the discovery that several of the
hijackers were in the country illegally, on false or expired visas, and most
had been living in the U.S. undetected for years before carrying out the
attacks.50  Others, like former Senator Warren B. Rudman, felt
manipulated: "We just have to recognize that we cannot bend over
backwards in our innate American fairness to overlook that there are
some people trying to hurt us.'Z
t
Despite the rapidity with which Congress passed the USA Patriot
Act, and the circumstances surrounding it, the USA Patriot Act is
4' Aggravated felonies include drug trafficking, rape, sexual abuse of a minor,
murder, or any other crime punishable by up to one year's imprisonment. 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2003).
46 See Ronald L. Plesser et al., USA Patriot Act for Internet and Communications
Companies, 19 COMPUTER & INTERNET LAw. 1, 1 (2002).
47 Only Rep. John Conyers (D-Mich.) and Sen. Russell Feingold (D-Wis.) voted
against the measure.
48 See Kevin F. Ryan, Evil, Patriotism, and the Rule of Law, 27 VT. B. J. 7, 7
(2001).49 This sentiment was undoubtedly fueled by responses like that of now-deposed
Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, whose reaction to attacks has been described as
"jubilant." See Iran Urged [to] Join War on Terror, Sept. 24, 2001,
www.cnn.com/200I/WORLD/europe/09/23/gen.straw.iran/index.html.
50 See Neil A. Lewis & David Johnston, After the Attacks: The Investigation:
Justice Dept. Identifies 19 Men as Suspected Hijackers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15,
2001, at A2. Several of the hijackers lived in Florida, New Jersey, California,
Massachusetts, and Arizona. Id.
51 Purdy, supra note 5. Sen. Rudman is currently chairman of the president's
foreign intelligence advisory board.
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nevertheless thoughtful and responsive to the twin tasks of fighting
terrorism without eroding individual rights more than necessary. The Act
has achieved this through incremental amendment of existing acts, which
were passed under normal circumstances.52  Moreover, the "war on
terrorism" (and, thus, the provisions contained in the Act necessary to
wage that war) commanded unprecedented public support, 3 Historical
examples of restrictions on domestic freedom for national security
purposes (e.g., suspension of the writ of habeas corpus during the Civil
War) teach us that Americans will accept a reasonable level of restraint
on liberty and will respond appropriately so long as two basic conditions
exist: First, the civilian leadership must effectively articulate the
necessity, and second, there must be a generally understood consensus
for action.
54
The public's recognition of the need for national security, along
with the realization that America had been attacked from within,
prompted one of the Act's main provisions, Title IV, which expands the
Attorney General's powers under the AEDPA and the IIRIRA to detain,
deport, or deny admission to suspect aliens attempting to enter the United
States. Title II of the Act, which broadens the government's existing
authority to conduct confidential searches of suspected terrorists' homes,
and to intercept and monitor suspects' telephone and Internet
communications, recognizes that investigations of terrorist plans "depend
on stealth" to prevent them before they are carried out*
5
Although critics of the Act have generally focused their ire on
Titles II and IV, the Act also contains many less controversial provisions.
52 The USA Patriot Act, by contrast, was passed under highly unusual
circumstances. "How unusual? Congressional negotiators fimalized the language
of the Patriot Act in a small room in the Capitol building while House and
Senate offices were closed due to an anthrax attack." Plesser et al., supra note
44, at 1.
53 In March 2002, the approval rating for President George W. Bush's "war on
terrorism" was a high 82%. Paul Craig Roberts, Where National Security is
Slipping, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2002, at Commentary. President Bush's
overall approval ratings dropped to the mid-50s in various polls conducted from
March 3, 2003 through March 16, 2003, just prior to Bush's declaration of war
on Iraq. The Century Foundation's Public Opinion Watch,
www.tcf.org/Opinions/PublicOpinionWatch/March 101-6_2003.htmil.
54 Col. Thomas W. McShane, Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Security:
Balancing American Values in Difficult Times, 23-Dec. Pa. Law. 46,47 (2001).
55 See Banks & Bowman, supra note 13, at 93.
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These include Congressional condemnation of discrimination against
Arab and Muslim Americans, grant programs to promote state and local
anti-terrorism preparedness, expanded penalties for fraud in the
solicitation of charitable contributions, and the federal Victims'
Compensation Fund.56
III. Immigration Overview: Congressional Discretion and
Judicial Deference
A. Judicial Deference: The Plenary Powers Doctrine
It is a widely accepted notion that sovereign nations have the
power to regulate or even prohibit immigration. 7  The United States'
ability to control its own borders is "essential to its safety, its
independence, and its welfare."5 8 To that end, United States immigration
law may best be described as a "fabric of discretion and judicial
deference." 59 This hands-off approach by the courts is rooted in the
"plenary powers doctrine," pursuant to which courts exhibit
extraordinary deference to Congress and the Executive in certain
contexts,60 and the separation of powers doctrine, which precludes the
Court from reviewing certain decisions made by Congress or the
President.6' It is in fact Congress to which the constitution grants sole
control over immigration matters,62 and the Supreme Court has
56 See USA Patriot Act, §§ 102, 624, 1011, and 1014.
57 See, e.g., Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) (recognizing that
sovereign nations have an inherent right to exclude or expel aliens).
58 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 711 (1893).59 See Daniel Kanstroom, Surrounding the Hole in the Doughnut: Discretion and
Deference in US. Immigration Law, 71 TUL. L. REv. 703, 709 (1997).
60 See id. at 707.
61 "The reasons that preclude judicial review of political questions also dictate a
narrow standard of review of decisions made by Congress or the President in the
area of immigration and naturalization." Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81-82
(1976).
62 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4. This clause grants Congress specific power over
"naturalization," which necessarily includes immigration. Congress has
delegated extensive power to executive branch agencies, such as the
Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Department of Justice, to carry
out its immigration policies.
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acknowledged that "over no conceivable subject is the legislative power
of Congress more complete than it is over the admission of aliens.'63
Thus, Congress is responsible for establishing the criteria for
determining aliens' initial admissibility, as well as the criteria for their
continued presence in the United States.64 Congress may also set the
terms under which an alien may be detained pending a determination of
admissibility. Whether these criteria are broad and permissive, as they
were during the mass migrations to the U.S. in the early 1900s. 5 or
narrow and restrictive, is determined in part by the public's perceptions
of immigrants and the social, economic, or security threats believed to be
posed by them.66
The Supreme Court has consistently upheld Congress's
discretion under the plenary powers doctrine to regulate immigration. 7
Any policy toward aliens, particularly as it relates to national security, is
vitally and intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in
regard to the conduct of foreign relations, the war power, and the
maintenance of a republican form of government. Such matters are so
exclusively trusted to the political branches of government as to be
largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference. 68
The Court's deference to Congress's power over matters of
immigration continues today. As recently as 1983, the Court reaffirmed
63 Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (quoting Oceanic Navigation Co. v.
Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 329 (1909)).
64 See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893) ("The right of a nation to
expel or deport foreigners.., rests upon the same grounds, and is as absolute
and unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their entrance into the
country.").
65 From 1900 through 1930, a period referred to as the "Great Wave of
Immigration," 47 million immigrants were admitted to the United States.
Comparisons of 2 0'h Century U.S. Population Growth by Decade, at
www.numbersusa.com/overpopulation/decadegraph.html
66 The AEDPA, for example, is thought by some to have "crested a wave of anti-
immigrant sentiment." See Kanstroom, supra note 57, at 705.
67 See, e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 528 (1954) (confirming broad
congressional authority over admission of aliens); Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S.32, 38
(1924) (affirming that power to regulate aliens is vested in the political branches
of government); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 731 (1893) ("the
judicial department cannot properly express an opinion upon the wisdom, the
policy or the justice of the measures enacted by Congress in the exercise of the
powers confided to it by the Constitution over this subject.").
68 Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952).
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its belief that the plenary authority of Congress over aliens "is not open
to question."69
B. Constitutional Protection of Noncitizens
Once an alien has been deemed admissible, his continued
presence in the United States is a revocable privilege conferred by
Congress, not a constitutional right.70 The AEDPA, for example,
expanded the kinds of felony convictions for which an alien may be
deported,71 even after long periods of legal residence in the United
States, and the IIRIRA precludes judicial review of deportation
decisions.
72
The Supreme Court has long refused to hold that deportation
constitutes punishment.73 Because deportation hearings are regarded as
civil, not criminal proceedings, not all of the due process protections of a
criminal trial are made available to an alien in a deportation hearing74 It
is for this reason that theprocess by which an alien may be deported is
surrounded by great ambiguity.75 Though the judiciary usually grants
considerable deference to the legislative and executive branches as a
result of their plenary power to regulate immigration, the Supreme Court
69 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 940-41 (1983).
70 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 70 S. Ct. 309, 312
(1950); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892).
71 Aggravated felonies include drug trafficking, rape, sexual abuse of a minor,
murder, or any other crime punishable by up to one year's imprisonment. 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43).
72 The relevant language of IIRIRA is clear. Final deportation orders are
addressed under the heading of "Matters Not Subject to Judicial Review," and
the Act provides that "no court shall have jurisdiction to review any final order
of removal." Pub. L. No. 104-208 § 242(a)(2).
73 Lisa Mendel, The Court's Failure to Recognize Deportation as Punishment: A
CriticalAnalysis of Judicial Deference, 5 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 205,
205 (2000) (citing Burgess v. Salmon, 97 U.S. 381, 384 (1878)). See also Fong
Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) (holding that deportation is
not punishment).
74 See Clarence E. Zachery, Jr., The Alien Terrorist Removal Procedures:
Removing the Enemy Among Us or Becoming the Enemy From Within?, 9 GEO.
IMMIGR. L. J. 291, 299 (1995). Classification of deportation proceedings as civil
also allows laws governing deportation to be applied retroactively, since the ex
post facto clause applies only to criminal matters. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.
13, cl. 10 (stating prohibitions against ex post facto laws).
75 See Solbakken, supra note 40, at 1401.
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has extended the constitutional protections of the Fifth, Sixth, and
Fourteenth Amendments to aliens.76  However, these constitutional
protections are not as complete as those afforded to American citizens.
77
The Court in Mathews v. Diaz78 explained that:
The fact that all persons, aliens and citizens alike, are
protected by the Due Process Clause does not lead to the
further conclusion that all aliens are entitled to enjoy all
the advantages of citizenship or, indeed, to the
conclusion that all aliens must be placed in a single,
homogeneous legal classification. For a host of
constitutional and statutory provisions rest on the
premise that a legitimate distinction between citizens
and aliens may justify attributes and benefits for one
class not accorded to the other; and the class of aliens is
itself a heterogeneous multitude of persons with a wide-
ranging variety of ties to this country.
79
Thus, how much constitutional protection an alien may claim
depends on his citizenship status (or lack thereof), 0s which can be viewed
as a point on a continuum. At one end are natural-born or naturalized
American citizens, who are guaranteed every due process protection
under the constitution, and may be stripped of their citizenship only in
exceedingly rare cases. At the other end of the continuum are aliens,
whose due process protections are limited and may be revoked altogether
(for example, the AEDPA prohibits access to habeas corpus relief for
certain removable aliens),.8 Along the continuum, additional
76 See Zachery, supra note 74, at 297-98 (citing Wong Wing v. United States,
163 U.S. 228 (1896) (Fifth and Sixth Amendments protect a deportable alien in
a criminal trial)); see also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment bars discrimination against
aliens)).
77 See id. at 298.
78426 U.S. 67, 78 (1976).
79 Id. at 78.
so See, e.g., United States v. Megahey, 553 F. Supp. 1180, 1181 (1982) (holding
that the different treatment accorded nonresident aliens is rationally related to
purposes of protecting the United States against various acts of foreign powers).
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 § 440(a) (1996)
[hereinafter AEDPA].
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constitutional protections are obtained as the alien's ties to the United
States become more significant.
The extent of an alien's constitutional protection also depends on
the context in which he attempts to exercise that protection. When the
context involves foreign affairs, such as deportation, exclusion, foreign
policy, or national security, for example, the alien's rights often give way
to an overriding governmental interest.82 Thus, "the Bill of Rights cloaks
an alien with its protective armor when the government attacks with
purely domestic powers, but when the political branches' foreign affairs
powers are unleashed, the armor pierces easily. 8 3 As a result, an alien
has a weak due process claim in a deportation hearing if the
governmental interest at stake is one of national security or foreign
policy.84
IV. USA Patriot Act Title IV: Protecting the Border
A. Admissibility: Governmental Interest in National
Security
[Ain alien who seeks admission to this country may not do so
under any claim of right. Admission of aliens to the United
States is a privilege granted by the sovereign United States
Government. Such privilege is granted to an alien only upon
such terms as the United States shall prescribe. 
8 5
The United States Congress has always set standards for the
admissibility of aliens into the country, and the Supreme Court has
consistently upheld Congress's discretion to do so.8 6  Over the years,
Congress has denied admission to aliens for a variety of reasons, such as
ethnicity, criminal intent or history (e.g., drug trafficking), terrorism, and
even political ideology.
82 Michael Scaperlanda, The Domestic Fourth Amendment Rights of Aliens: To
What Extent Do They Survive United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez?, 56
MO.L.REv. 213,235, 239-40 (1991).
83 Id. at 239-240.
4 Id.
85 United States ex rel. Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 70 S. Ct. 309, 312 (1950).
86 See Trevor Morrison, Removed from the Constitution? Deportable Aliens'
Access to Habeas Corpus Under the New Immigration Legislation, 35 COLUM.
J. TRANSAT'L L. 697, 708-10 (1997).
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1. Race
The Court first considered Congress's authority to exclude aliens
in the Chinese Exclusion Case,8 7 in which Congress responded to anti-
Asian hostility by passing legislation that suspended immigration of
Chinese laborers into the United States.8 ' The Court held that the
prerogative of the political branches to make immigration decisions
according to their perception of the public interest outweighed the rights
of the Chinese being excluded.8 9 The Court recognized that controlling
immigration-or, more precisely, controlling threats therefrom-was
necessary for the United States "[to] give security against foreign
aggression and encroachment." 90 Because "it matters not in what form"
such aggression and encroachment come, the court has, in some
instances, used it as the basis for racial discrimination.' 9' In fact, "[i]n
an undeviating line of cases spanning almost one hundred years, the
Court has declared itself powerless to review even those immigration
regulations that explicitly classify on such disfavored bases as race.'92
In most cases, the threat posed by racially excluded aliens was
largely an economic one.93 Yet, the government is charged "with
protecting this Nation from entrants who may bring anything harmful
into this country, whether that be communicable diseases, narcotics, or
87 See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
88 See Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary
Congressional Power, 6 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 288, n.173 (1984). Later, anti-
Japanese sentiment resulted in legislation prohibiting the entry of all Japanese
immigrants. See id
89 Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 606.
90Id.
9' For example, the Court in Chae Chan Ping derogatorily referred to "vast
hordes of [a foreign nation's] people crowing in upon us" as one form of
foreign aggression and encroachment, in response to the influx of Chinese
laborers to the U.S. in the early 1800s. Id.
92 Legomsky, supra note 88, at 255.
93 Today, immigration continues to impact the economy in different ways. For
example, the abundance of nonunion immigrants in Los Angeles permitted
unscrupulous firms to wipe out unionized janitors-half of whom were black-
by the 1990s. On the opposite end of the spectrum, Harvard economist George
Borjas has calculated that immigration in the 1980s redistributed more than
$100 billion a year away from working Americans and to the economic elite. See
Michael Lind, Hiring From Within, MOTHER JONES, July/Aug. 1998, available
at www.motherjones.com/motherjones/JA98/lind.html.
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explosives." 94  If aliens bring with them the threat of displacing
American workers or otherwise imperiling the nation's economy,
Congress is justified in excluding them? 5 In all of these cases the Court
has viewed aliens as "guests who may remain in the country subject to
the host's desire to extend hospitality.'
°6
2. Political Ideology
As early as 1904, the Supreme Court upheld provisions of the
1903 Immigration Act, which permitted exclusion of aliens who "believe
in or advocate overthrow" of any government. 97  In 1918 Congress
passed a law providing for the exclusion of aliens who "advise, advocate,
or teach, or . . . are members of or affiliated with any organization,
association, society, or group, that advises, advocates, or teaches,
opposition to all organized government.'" s In the 1920s membership in
a communist or totalitarian party was grounds for exclusion;99 later
grounds included participation in Nazi-era genocide or genocide-related
activities.00
The end of the Cold War led to a revision of U.S. law with
respect to exclusion based on one's beliefs.'0' However, a number of
ideological exclusion grounds remain, including membership in the
Communist Party "or any other totalitarian party" within recent years or
engaging in activities aimed at the overthrow of the United States
government.1
0 2
94 Montoya de Hemandez v. United States, 473 U.S. 531, 544 (1985).
95 For example, immigrants coming to the U.S. for employment must obtain a
labor certification, which is designed to ensure that the immigrant's employment
will not displace or otherwise disadvantage American workers. INA §
212(a)(5)(A).
96 Mendel, supra note 73, at 215 (citing Legomsky, supra note 88, at 269-70).97 Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 293 (1904).
98Act of Oct. 16, 1918, 40 Stat. 1012, amended by Act of June 5, 1920, 41 Stat.
1008.
99 See 8 U.S.C. § 1 182(a)(3)(D)(i) (2003).
'oo INA § 212 (a)(3)(E) (1994).
101 Maryam Kamali Miyamoto, The First Amendment After Reno v. American-
Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee: A Different Bill of Rights for Aliens? 35
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 183,212 (2000).
102 See, e.g., the Alien Registration Act. 54 Stat. 670 (1940). Under that Act, it
was necessary to prove in each case, where membership in the Communist Party
was the basis for deportation, that the party did, in fact, advocate overthrow of
the U.S. government. The Internal Security Act of 1950 dispensed with the need
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3. Criminal Intent or History
Since President Reagan declared a "war on drugs" in the 1980s,
Congress has employed various methods for stemming the flow of drugs
into the United States, most importantly by denying admission to those
who attempt to smuggle drugs into the country. At the border, where
drug smugglers are often caught with their contraband, the scales tip
appreciably in favor of the government, especially since "due process
does not invest any alien with a right to enter the United States.'
0 3
The case of Montoya de Hernandez v. United States 104 provides
a particularly pointed example of the government's power to regulate our
borders. De Hernandez was detained by customs officials upon her
arrival in the U.S. from Bogota, Colombia. The officials had reasonable
cause to suspect that she was attempting to smuggle narcotics hidden in
balloons in her digestive tract. De Hernandez was ultimately detained
for approximately sixteen hours as a result of her refusal to undergo an x-
ray, and her "heroic efforts to avoid the usual calls of nature."'0 5
Officials eventually obtained a court order authorizing an x-ray and a
rectal examination. Subsequent to the examination, de Hernandez
excreted eighty-eight balloons over four days, containing a total of 528
grams of 80% pure cocaine.
In affirming de Hernandez's detention, the Court reaffirmed
Congress's power to protect the nation by stopping and examining
persons entering the country, and held that the balance between the
interests of the Government and those of the individual is "struck more
favorably to the Government at the border."'06 Despite de Hernandez's
for such proof. Galvan v. Press, 75 S. Ct. 737, 742 (1954). Today, if the alien can
show that he is not otherwise a threat to the security of the United States,
termination of membership in the party two years before applying for a visa will
suffice. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(D)(ii) (2003).
103 Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 222-23 (1953)
(Jackson, J., dissenting). No member of the Court contradicted Justice Jackson's
statement.
104 See U.S. v. Montoya de Hemandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985).
105 Id. at 535.
'06 Id. at 540. Even race may be considered at the border. See United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975) (likelihood that an individual of
Mexican ancestry on the Southwest border was an alien was sufficiently high to
make the ancestry a legitimate factor in Border Patrol's decision to stop and
interrogate); see also United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 563 (1976)
(finding no constitutional violation in referring motorists to a detailed secondary
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"long, uncomfortable, indeed, humiliating" detention-which, under
other circumstances, might constitute a violation of due process and
other constitutional protections-the government is charged "with
protecting this Nation from entrants who may bring anything harmful
into this country, whether that be communicable diseases, narcotics, or
explosives."'
10 7
De Hernandez involved an alien's intent to smuggle drugs in the
United States. The AEDPA and the IIRIRA deal not with an alien's
intent to commit a crime, but with his past history of having done so.
Intended to expel those aliens who pose a threat to America's national
security, the AEDPA provides for retroactive and prospective deportation
of aliens convicted of certain listed "aggravated felonies," including drug
trafficking and firearms trafficking.08 Passed shortly after the AEDPA,
the IIRIRA retroactively rendered permanent residents with criminal
records deportable, and precluded courts of appeals'09 from exercising
jurisdiction to review a final removal order against an alien removable by
reason of a conviction for, inter alia, an aggravated felony.' 10
4. Terrorism
In 1996, the AEDPA added a new "terrorist activity" provision"'
aimed at excluding potential terrorists from the United States.
"Terrorist" activities include hijacking of an aircraft, vessel, or vehicle;
kidnapping and threatening to kill another individual; and the use of
biological or chemical agents or nuclear devices.".2 In 1997, then-
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright identified thirty "foreign terrorist
organizations" under the AEDPA, mandating the denial of United States
visas to all organization members, and imposing prison terms of ten
years on Americans convicted of supporting any of the listed groups.13
inspection at U.S.-Mexico checkpoint even if based on apparent Mexican
ancestry).
107 Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 544.
'08 AEDPA § 706 (1996).
109 With respect to district courts, Congress has not spoken with sufficient clarity
to strip them of their jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions regarding final removal
orders. See generally INS v. St. Cyr, 531 U.S. 1107 (2001).
"'o See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C). This provision was upheld by Calcano-
Martinezv. INS, 121 S. Ct. 2268 (2001).
".. AEDPA§ 302 (2003)).
113 Ross, supra note 38, at 91.
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Fourteen of the groups are Arab or Muslim (including Al Qaeda); there
are also two each of Israeli, Turkish, Japanese, Colombian, Peruvian, and
Greek groups, plus one Spanish group and one Sri Lankan group.' 14
B. Admissibility Pursuant to the USA Patriot Act
Several sections of Title IV of the Patriot Act broaden the
foundation laid by case law, the AEDPA, and the IIRIRA in order to
protect the United States from those who threaten national security.
Broadly speaking, the Act grants the Attorney General the power (in
conjunction with the Secretary of State) to assess the threat that an alien
may pose to national security and deny the alien admission if
warranted. 1 5 To determine the nature of the threat, the Act broadens
several statutory definitions relating to terrorism. First, the definition of
a "terrorist" has been expanded to include a representative of a foreign
terrorist organization; a member of a "political, social, or other similar
group whose public endorsement of acts of terrorist activity . . .
undermines United States efforts to reduce or eliminate terrorist
activities;"" 6 anyone who has used his "position of prominence within
any country to endorse or espouse terrorist activity or a terrorist
organization;""' 7 and the spouse or child of an alien who is inadmissible
for one of the foregoing reasons.
118
The definition of "terrorist activity" has been similarly
broadened to include committing or inciting to commit terrorist
activity;119 gathering information on potential targets for terrorist
activity; recruiting others for membership in a terrorist organization; or
soliciting funds for any sort of terrorist activity as defined in the Act that
the contributor "reasonably should know" would further the
I"4 See id. n.104.
115 "Any alien . . . [who] intends while in the United States to engage solely,
principally, or incidentally in activities that could endanger the welfare, safety,
or security of the United States is inadmissible." USA Patriot Act § 411 (2001).
"
6 1d. § 411 (a)(1)(A).
7id.
118 Id. Spouses and children of terrorists as defined herein are inadmissible only
if the activity causing the alien to be defined a "terrorist" under this section
occurred within the last five years. Id.
"9 Incitement is defined as speech intended to produce imminent lawless action,
and from which a reasonable person would believe that lawless action is likely
to result. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
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organization's terrorist activities.120 This latter provision was deemed
necessary to prevent those who fund terrorist groups from simply
denying that they were aware of the group's activities in order to avoid
deportation or inadmissibility.
Civil libertarians have attacked the expanded definition of
"terrorist activity" as overly broad,'121 but the government's need to
employ these classifications is sufficiently compelling to outweigh the
burden on constitutional rights.122 This is because terrorist attacks differ
from most other crimes in three important respects: First, terrorist attacks
are usually planned well in advance, sometimes for years, by an
elaborate network of participants located all over the world. 24 Second,
unlike most crimes, terrorist networks require significant funding in
order to carry out their attacks.' 25 Third, terrorist groups are known to
120 USA Patriot Act § 41 l(a)(1)(F) (2001).
121 One immigration lawyer noted that someone who "at the end of Ramadan
does their charitable tithing to an orphanage in South Lebanon that was
established by Hezbollah" could be labeled a terrorist under the new definition.
Purdy, supra note 5.
122 Ideologies that advocate immediate action, such as Islamic fatwas (religious
rulings) ordering Muslims to kill Americans, are governed by the Brandenburg
test, and therefore do not enjoy First Amendment protection. See Brandenburg,
395 U.S. 444, 447 (speech intended to produce imminent lawless action, and
from which a reasonable person would believe that lawless action is likely to
result, is exempted from First Amendment protection). With respect to
deportation proceedings, however, aliens may be deported for "speech" for
which they could not otherwise be punished, because deportation is a civil
matter, not criminal punishment. See Burgess v. Salmon, 97 U.S. 381, 384
(1878); see also Miyamoto, supra note 101, at 194.
123 Video tapes believed to be "scouting" tapes for the World Trade Center
attacks were made as early as four years before the attacks were carried out. See
Video is Purportedly September 11 Scouting Tape, Mar. 5, 2003, at
www.cnn.com/2003/US/03/05/wtc.tape/index.html.
124 Al Qaeda, for example, is believed to have operatives all of the world and to
have forged alliances with other extremist groups. See Tapes Give Evidence of
al Qaeda's Global Reach, Aug. 22, 2002, at
www.cnn.com/2002/US/08/22/terror.tape.main/index.html.
125 See Matthew Levitt, Stemming the Flow of Terrorist Financing: Practical
and Conceptual Challenges, 27-SPG FLFWA 59, 61 (Winter/Spring 2003)
("Clearly, following the money trial represents a critical and effective tool both
in reacting to terrorist attacks and in engaging in preemptive disruption efforts to
prevent future attacks."). See also Eric Lichtblau & William Glaberson,
Millions Raised for Qaeda in Brooklyn, U.S. Says, N.Y. TIMES, March 5, 2003,
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form "sleeper cells," in which the members of the cell participate in
activities such as training, fund-raising, and scouting of locations 126 in
preparation for future terrorist attacks.' 7 In short, because the execution
of a large-scale terrorist attack requires training, communication,
funding, and planning, it is imperative that law enforcement be able to
approach the problem on several different fronts in order to prevent
future attacks. Moreover, these provisions defining terrorist activity
differ little from either those contained in the Immigration and
Nationality Act ("INA") or over a dozen similar laws passed prior to
1997.128
Critics have also condemned the expanded definition of
"terrorist" as the singling out of people based on nationality or
ethnicity. 29 But terrorism takes many forms-from Japan's Aum
Shinrikyo (a nihilist cult), to Greece's Revolutionary People's Struggle
("ELA") (an anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist group), to Peru's Shining
Path (a Maoist organization). Terrorist groups are designated as such by
their activities, not their nationalities, though many classifications are
ethnically based out of necessity. This is because some terrorist
groups-such as the Irish Republican Army or the Tamil Tigers in Sri
Lanka-are fighting wars of national independence, albeit by extreme
and unacceptable means. Still other groups are ideologically or
at Al; .Al Qaeda, Organized Crime, and Cash, Aug. 30, 2002, at
www.cnn.com/2002/US/08/30/boettcher/otsc/index.html (explaining that
because many assets have been frozen, Al Qaeda is now turning to money from
illegitimate sources, such as drugs and black-market diamonds).
126 Among the locations appearing on alleged "scouting" tapes are the Statue of
Liberty, the Brooklyn Bridge, the Golden Gate Bridge, and the Sears Tower in
Chicago. See Video is Purportedly September 11 Scouting Tape, Mar. 5, 2003, at
www.cnn.com/2003/US/03/05/wtc.tape/index.htmi.
127 For example, in January 2003, Faysal Galab, an accused member of one such
"sleeper" cell operating near Buffalo, New York, pled guilty to attending a
training camp in April 2001 run by Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. He also pled guilty
to contributing money, goods, and services to the terrorist group. See Robert F.
Worth, Accused Member of Terror Cell Near Buffalo Agrees to Guilty Plea, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 11, 2003, at A9.
128 See Ross, supra note 38, at 77.
129 See, e.g., Purdy, supra note 5. As one FBI official has noted, "We have a
problem with Islamic terrorism.... If we had a problem with Latvian terrorism,
we'd focus on Latvians." John Mintz & Michael Grunwald, FBI Terror Probe
Focuses on U.S. Muslims; Expanded Investigations, New Tactics Stir Allegations
of Persecution, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 1998, at Al.
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religiously motivated (e.g., Shining Path's Maoist ideology or Al
Qaeda's Islamic fundamentalism). Thus, the ethnic classifications of
many terrorist groups are not invidious, just a necessary and concomitant
consequence of the group's own self-identification.
Moreover, admission to the U.S. can be denied (or granted) upon
any basis of Congress's choosing, even if it were invidious. Should
Congress choose to admit only, say, Chinese citizens from now on-or,
conversely, to deny admissibility only to Chinese-there is little that the
President or Supreme Court could do.' 30 Aliens trying to gain admission
to the United States are not protected by the constitution prior to their
admission, and it is properly within Congress's discretion to determine
which aliens pose a threat to our national security at any given time.
13 1
C. Detention
[Detention] is vital to preventing, disrupting, or delaying new
attacks. It is difficult for a person injail or under detention to
murder innocent people or to aid and abet in terrorism. 1
32
In 1996, the AEDPA and the IIRIRA extended mandatory
detention to persons convicted of any of an additional 133 five major
categories of crime, including noncitizens inadmissible or deportable on
130 There is also, presumably, little that the public could do, as immigration
levels have consistently increased over the years, even as a majority of the
American public favor limiting immigration. For example, an online reader's
poll conducted by the Atlanta Journal-Constitution in March 2002 found that
ninety-nine percent of those responding favored increased controls on
immigration. Reader Opinions: Most Call for Tighter Immigration, ATLANTA J-
CoNsT., Mar. 6, 2002, available at www.ajc.com.
131 "Changes in world politics and in our internal economy bring legislative
adjustments affecting the rights of various classes of aliens to admission and
deportation." Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 534 (1952).
132 Purdy, supra note 5 (quoting Attorney General John Ashcroft).
133 Prior to 1996, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 made conviction of an
aggravated felony-including murder, drug trafficking, and firearms
trafficking-a ground for deportation and mandated detention for any
aggravated felon awaiting a deportation hearing. See Stephen H. Legomsky, The
Detention of Aliens: Theories, Rules, and Discretion, 30 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L.
REV. 531, 533 (1999).
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terrorist grounds. 34 Also, subject to some narrow exceptions, arriving
passengers whom immigration inspectors find inadmissible must be
detained pending a full removal hearing (the results of which, under the
AEDPA, are not subject to judicial review). 35
The USA Patriot Act amends the Immigration and Nationality
Act, 3 6 picking up where the AEDPA and the IIRIRA left off with respect
to detaining aliens on terrorist grounds. Under section 412 of the Act,
the Attorney General may take into custody any alien that he has
"reasonable ground[s]" to believe is engaged in or is likely to be engage
in any terrorist activity after entry, 37 or is engaged in "any other activity"
that endangers the national security of the United States.'38 However, the
Attorney General's power in this respect is not limitless. He has only
seven days after detention to either place the alien in removal
proceedings or charge him with a criminal offense. Otherwise, the alien
must be released.'39 Thus, although an alien may be detained initially on
"reasonable grounds," it is only for a short period, and more is needed to
hold him any longer.
Any alien not removed, and whose removal is unlikely in the
reasonably foreseeable future, can be detained for an additional six
months only if his release will threaten the national security of the U.S.
or the safety of any community or person.140 This provision allows the
Attorney General additional time to conduct an investigation and charge
the alien, when the seven-day window would provide insufficient time to
do so.
Unlike the incarceration imposed as part of a criminal sentence,
detention of noncitizens in connection with removal proceedings is not
constitutionally considered "punishment.'f 4 1  As such, detention does
not invoke the full range of constitutional safeguards provided in
134 AEDPA § 302 defines terrorist grounds as any foreign organization that
engages in terrorist activity that threatens the security of United States nationals
or the national security of the United States.
135 See Legomsky, supra note 133, at 534.
136 8 U.S.C. § 1101 etseq. (1994).
37 '7rerrorist activity" is defined as, inter alia, committing or inciting to commit
terrorist activity, gathering information on potential targets for terrorist activity,
recruiting others for membership in a terrorist organization. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182.
138 USA Patriot Act § 236A(a) (2001).
139 Id. § 236A(a)(5).
'
40 Id. § 236A(a)(6).
141 See Legomsky, supra note 133, at 536.
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criminal proceedings, such as the Sixth Amendment rights to a speedy,
public jury trial and to counsel' 42 Much like its use in the criminal
context, however, detention of suspected terrorist aliens is useful in
furthering national security goals. Professor Stephen Legomsky has
identified three theories supporting detention of noncitizens pending
removal: (1) preventing individuals from absconding; (2) isolating those
who pose a danger to the community; and (3) deterring certain types of
immigration violations in the first place.
143
The most obvious justification for detention-to prevent
individuals from disappearin-is the same rationale underlying pretrial
detention in criminal cases. With respect to immigration, the numbers
speak for themselves: Before mandatory detention was imposed, about
ninety percent of non-detained persons who were ordered removed failed
to surrender themselves for removal. 45 Most probably believe they have
nothing to lose: "If someone wishes to enter the United States, and the
INS alleges that he or she is inadmissible ... or deportable, the person
might conclude there is little to lose by absconding. ' 46 Moreover, many
noncitizens believe that absconding will buy them additional time in the
U.S., and that, if caught, they will not be punished beyond the removal
that otherwise awaited them) 47
A person convicted of a qualifying crime (under the AEDPA) or
suspected of terrorism may be even more likely to disappear rather than
face removal. 48 Such persons are less likely to qualify for discretionary
relief from removal,'149 and are considered more likely to fear removal if
apprehended. 1
50
142 see id.
143 See id,
144 See id.
145 Id. at 537 (citing the Vera Institute for Justice, The Appearance Assistance
Program: Attaining Compliance with Immigration Laws through Community
Supervision (1998)).
146 Legomsky, supra note 133, at 537.
4 See generally Peter A. Schuck, INS Detention and Removal: A "White
Paper," 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 667 (1997). Schuck notes that immigration laws
now authorize civil and criminal penalties, though they are unlikely to be
imposed. Id. at 671-72.
149 See Legomsky, supra note 337, at 538.
149 See id.
150 see id.
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Moreover, "the terrorist category is the one to which the public
safety rationale seems most applicable."' 5' The already overwhelming
probability that a non-detained removable alien will abscond absent
mandatory detention, combined with the public safety threat that non-
detained criminals and suspected terrorists may pose, provide ample
justification for mandatory detention in the case of the suspected
terrorists.
The third theory identified by Professor Legomsky, deterrence of
immigration violations, may also play a role in protecting the United
States from foreign terrorists. First, the unpleasantness of the detention
itself might deter a potential terrorist from seeking entry into the United
States. 52  Second, mandatory detention dashes the hopes of anyone
expecting to remain at large pending a removal hearing, then going
underground to complete his terrorist mission.
53
The justifications for detention are compelling even where the
removable alien is guilty of nothing more than being in the United States
illegally. 154 In a case like that of the September 11"' hijackers, for
example, pre-removal detention is particularly compelling. First, such
terrorists are well funded,' 55 making it much easier for them to disappear
than it might be for an immigrant of lesser means, such as a factory
worker. Second, terrorists, including members of Al Qaeda, are known
to possess various false documents and usually multiple passports,
56
making it easier to disappear if released. Third, detention facilitates
extradition where a suspected terrorist is wanted in another country. By
detaining the suspect, the United States may increase goodwill and anti-
terrorism cooperation with foreign nations. Most importantly, detention
allows time to build a criminal case against a suspected terrorist,
especially on a conspiracy charge assuming that the government can
persuade one of the suspect's peers to cooperate.
151 Id. at 539.
152 See id. at 540.
153 See id.
154 Discussed supra, justifications include preventing the alien from absconding,
and isolating those who pose a threat to the community.
155 See Indira A.R. Lakshmanan, Profit, not Ideology, Drives Group Sought by
U.S., Manila, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 26, 2002, at A8.
156 See, e.g., Richard Broudreaux, Justice: Tunisian Immigrants are Given
Sentences of Up to Five Years for Conspiracy, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2002, at
A10. Terrorists have procured fake passports, identity cards, driver's licenses,
and other documents. Id.
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The Attorney General's powers under the USA Patriot Act also
contain sufficient protections for the detained alien. Checks on the
Attorney General's power include some access to habeas corpus
proceedings for detained aliens, 157 mandatory reports to the House and
Senate Committees on the Judiciary 58 and review of certification every
six months as to the alien's status as a threat
59
Given the grave threat to national security, and the compelling
justifications for detention, the Attorney General's expanded powers are
not only warranted, but necessary. Detaining individuals in order to
prevent them from simply disappearing into the interior-and, in the case
of suspected terrorist aliens, perpetrating their attacks-is vital to
national security.
D. Deportation
The right of a nation to expel or deport foreigners who have not
been naturalized, or taken any steps towards becoming citizens
of the country, rests upon the same grounds, and is as absolute
and unqualified, as the right to prohibit and prevent their
entrance. 1
60
The Supreme Court first articulated the foregoing principle in the
late 1800s and continues to do so today: "For reasons long recognized as
valid, the responsibility for regulating the relationship between the
United States and our alien visitors has been committed to the political
branches of the Federal Government.' 16' Thus, Congress may remove
those aliens whom it believes should no longer be allowed to reside in
the United States. 62 The INA 63 governs the terms by which an alien
may be removed. Section 1251B of the INA provides that "any alien
157 Proceedings may be initiated by application filed with the Supreme Court or
a justice thereof, any circuit judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, or any jurisdiction otherwise have jurisdiction to entertain
the application. Patriot Act § 236A(b)(2)(A)(i)-(iv).
151 See id. § 236A(c).
'59 See id. § 236A(a)(7). The alien may request reconsideration of the Attorney
General's certification every six months, and may submit documents or other
evidence in support of that request. Id.
60 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893).
161 Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976).
162 Under AEDPA, such aliens include those who have committed felonies. Id.
163 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1994).
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who has engaged, is engaged, or at any time after entry engages in any
terrorist activity is deportable."' 64 The INA defines "terrorist activity" as
involving any of the following:
(I) The hijacking or sabotage of any conveyance (including
an aircraft, vessel, or vehicle).
(II) The seizing or detaining, and threatening to kill, injure, or
continue to detain, another individual in order to compel a third
person (including a governmental organization) to do or abstain
from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the
release of the individual seized or detained.
(III) A violent attack upon an internationally protected person (as
defined in section 1116(b)(4) of Title 18) or upon the liberty of
such a person.
(IV) An assassination.
(V) The use of any (a) biological agent, chemical agent, or
nuclear weapon or device, or (b) explosive or firearm (other
than for mere personal monetary gain), with intent to endanger,
directly
or indirectly, the safety of one or more individuals or to cause
substantial damage to property.
(VI) A threat, attempt, or conspiracy to do any of the
foregoing.
165
Congress's power also extends to the removal process itself. With
passage of the AEDPA, for example, Congress 6prohibited access to
habeas corpus relief for certain removable aliens,16 a provision that-if
applied to citizens-would be unconstitutional. 167 Another Congressional
statute, the IIRIRA, facilitated expedited removal proceedings for those
'641d. § 1251B.
165 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(ii) (1994).
'66 See AEDPA § 440(a) (1996).
167 The constitution's Suspension Clause forbids suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus except in cases of rebellion or invasion, and applies only to U.S. citizens.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. In the exercise of its broad power over
immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if
applied to citizens. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79 (1976).
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aliens convicted of certain felonies.16 8 And because deportation is not
considered punishment, 69 the constitution's prohibition of ex post facto
laws 170 does not apply to the retroactivity provisions found in the AEDPA
and IRRIRA.
The Supreme Court traditionally has upheld Congress's power
over deportation and, more importantly, the legislature's ability to
preclude judicial review of deportation orders. In Carlson v. Landon,171
the Court held that expulsion of aliens was "essentially a power of the
political branches of government," and that opportunities for judicial
review would be granted "as Congress may see fit to authorize or
permit.' ' 172 In 1996, Congress saw fit to withdraw all access to judicial
review: "Any final order of deportation against an alien who is
deportable by reason of having committed a criminal offense covered in
several enumerated sections of the INA shall not be subject to review by
any court."'173  Several circuit courts have upheld the provision. In
Duldulao v. INS,174 for example, the Ninth Circuit relied heavily on
Carlson, holding that "aliens have no constitutional right to judicial
review of deportation orders.' 75  The Fifth Circuit has agreed,
explaining that the AEDPA section 440(a) "effectively eliminates all
judicial review of certain criminal alien appeals," and, correspondingly,
the court's jurisdiction to hear such appeals. 176 The Supreme Court,
apparently satisfied with the position it articulated in Carlson, has
declined to grant certiorari on the issue.
168 "Aggravated felonies" under the IIRIRA include drug trafficking, rape,
sexual abuse of a minor, murder, or any other crime punishable by up to one
year's imprisonment. 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(43).
169 See Burgess v. Salmon, 97 U.S. 381, 384 (1878).
170 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3, cl. 10 (stating prohibitions against ex post
facto laws).
17' 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
172Id. at 537.
'7"AEDPA § 440(a) (codifiedat 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(10)).
'7' 90 F.3d 396 (9th Cir. 1996).
171 Id. at 400.
176 Mendez-Rosas v. INS, 87 F.3d 672, 675 (5th Cir. 1996).
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V. USA Patriot Act Title II: Enhanced Surveillance Procedures
A. Overview
The tradition of liberty in the United States casts a shadow
over all national security surveillance .... The core open-
ness of our society permits all of us, including the potential
terrorist, considerable freedom to move about, to associate
with others, and to act in furtherance ofpolitical aims.1 '7
Terrorists seldom forewarn of their attacks. Indeed, the point of
terrorism is to surprise one's enemy, threatening his sense of security,
7 8
To achieve their ends, terrorists hatch their plots in secret, sometimes
planning them for years, 7 9 before perpetrating their attacks on an
unsuspecting public.
As is true for other types of crimes, prevention is the key to
stopping terrorist attacks. Plots must be discovered and thwarted before
they can be carried out. Prevention is especially important in the context
of terror, however, since terror attacks tend to be of a larger scale and
more random occurrence than other crimes,1s° and are specifically geared
177 Banks & Bowman, supra note 13, at 93 n.715 (citing RICHARD A.
FALKENRATH ET AL., AMERICA'S ACHILLES HEEL: NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND
CHEMICAL TERRORISM AND COVERTATrACK 8 (1998)).
178 A 1995 House Report referred to the United States' vulnerability to "random,
unpredictable acts of terrorism." H.R. REP. NO. 104-383 (1995). Indeed, the
Central Intelligence Agency and Federal Bureau of Investigation have come
under intense criticism for their failure to anticipate the attacks of September 11,
with one White House aide calling the September I I attacks "an abject
intelligence failure." See, e.g., Massimo Calabresi & Romesh Ratnesar, Can We
Stop the Next Attack?, TIME, Mar. 11, 2002, at 24, 2002 WL 8385880.
179 Al Qaeda, for example, is thought to have terrorist "sleeper cells" scattered
all over the world, whose members wait for the cell to receive orders to carry out
a terrorist act. See Elaine Shannon, Al-Qaeda's Paper Trail, TIME, Dec. 3, 2001,
at 17, 2001 WL 2938563.
18o Although crime can occur anywhere, terror attacks typically occur in
everyday places where most people assume they are safe: at office buildings
(such as the World Trade Center), malls, nightclubs, and even pizza parlors. See,
e.g., www.usatoday.com/news/world/2002/06/1 9/bombings-glance.html
(chronology of Palestinian suicide bombings against Israelis occurring in taxis,
buses, nightclubs, train stations, parks, and supermarkets, among other
locations).
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toward causing widespread panic and fear.' 8' Moreover, routing out
terrorists presents a special challenge for law enforcement, as many
terrorists are "well-entrenched, sophisticated, and often shrouded in a
veil of legitimacy (such as operating under the camouflage of
purportedly charitable or humanitarian activity). ' '182
Law enforcement's power to prevent terrorist attacks is limited
by the Constitution's protection of individual rights, particularly the
Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and
seizures.I8 3 Striking a balance between individual rights and collective
security is no easy task, as one senior FBI official has bluntly observed:
"We know that whenever we do something, people are going to call us
jackbooted thugs. But if we do nothing, people are going to yell at us
when something blows up.
'' 4
The USA Patriot Act greatly expands law enforcement's power
to detect and prevent future terrorist attacks. The two most significant-
and controversial-provisions include confidential searches of suspected
terrorists ' 85 homes, and the power to intercept and monitor suspects'telephone and Internet communications.
B. Executive Authority and the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act8 6
Prior to 1978, federal courts had recognized the President's
inherent power to authorize warrantless electronic surveillance in matters
involving foreign intelligence and national security. 8 7 As early as 1775,
the President had assumed the authority to engage agents in foreign
181 The psychological damage wrought by such attacks can linger long after the
event is over. See, e.g., Matt Crenson, Psychological Fallout, Anxiety over
Terrorism Linger a Year After Attacks,
www.suntimes.com/special-sections/sept I /nation/psychological.html.
182 See Matthew Levitt, Stemming the Flow of Terrorist Financing: Practical
and Conceptual Challenges, 27-SPG FLFWA 59, 60 (Winter/Spring 2003).
183 See U.S. CONST. amend IV.
184 Mintz & Grunwald, supra note 129, at A1.
185 This particular provision applies to both noncitizen aliens and citizens, which
is one reason why it is regarded as controversial.
186 Pub. L. No. 95-511 (1978) (codified in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.).
187 See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 960 (1974); United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593 (3rd Cir. 1974) (en
banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 881 (1974); see William Michael, A Window on
Terrorism: The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 58 B. & BENCH MINN.
23, 23 (2001).
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intelligence matters' s through executive order. Similarly, Congress has
broad legislative authority over electronic surveillance and "can change
the rules with the stroke of a pen.' ' 9
The constitutionality of the executive and legislative branches'
long-standing practice of warrantless surveillance was first called into
question when the Supreme Court held in Katz v. United States'90 that the
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment' 91 applied to electronic
surveillance.' 92 Five years later, in United States v. United States District
Court,193 the Supreme Court first confronted the tensions between
unmonitored executive surveillance and individual freedoms within the
context of national security. The Court clarified that if the national
security threat was a domestic one, Katz still controlled, but reserved
judgment on a key issue-foreign security threats. 194
Enacted in response to this troubling constitutional issue, the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA") was intended to create a
"secure framework by which the Executive Branch may conduct
legitimate electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes within
the context of this Nation's commitment to privacy and individual
rights."'195 On a practical level, FISA's purpose is to review Justice
Department applications and issue secret warrants for electronic
surveillance' 96 and, since 1995, issue warrants for covert entries into
premises in connection with national security investigations.' 97 Congress
and President Clinton added the most current chapter of FISA in late
1998, when FISA amendments gave the government authority to engage
188 See Banks & Bowman, supra note 13, at 19.
189 McShane, supra note 54, at 49.
'90 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
191 "[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
192 Katz, 389 U.S. at 353, 356-57. Katz carefully excluded national security
surveillance from its holding. Id. at 358 n.23.
'9' 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (commonly known as the Keith case).
'94 Id. at 321-22.
'9' S.REIP No. 604, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 15.
'96 See 50 U.S.C. § 1803 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). FISA allows wiretapping of
both aliens and U.S. citizens when there is probable cause to believe that the
target is a member of a foreign terrorist group or the agent of a foreign power.
'
97 See id. § 1821-1829 (1994 & Supp. III 1997)) (addressing physical searches).
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in roving wiretaps, install pen registers, 198 and place "trap and trace"
devices' 99 on communication lines.2°
Responsibility for reviewing the government's applications and
issuing warrants rests with the "FISA Court." Pursuant to the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment,20 1 the FISA Court will not
approve the government's request for a physical search or surveillance
unless it finds probable cause to believe the target is a foreign power or
its agent;2°2 and unless it finds that "foreign intelligence information" is
being sought.20 3 Such information is defined as that which relates to the
ability of the United States to protect against, inter alia, sabotage or
international terrorism by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign
power.04 When the surveillance involves a "United States person,' 05
the information sought must be necessary to "(A) the national defense or
the security of the United States; or (B) the conduct of the foreign affairs
of the United States.'Q0 6
198 A pen register records the numbers dialed from a telephone. It does not
overhear oral communications and does not indicate whether calls are actually
completed. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 736 (1979) (citing United States v.
N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 161 (1977)).
199 "Trap and trace" devices record the telephone numbers of the subject's
incoming calls. U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. F.B.I., 276 F.3d 620, 623 (2002).
200 See Pub. L. No. 105-272, 112 Stat. 2396 (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 4041,
1841-1846, 1861-1863 (West 2000)).
201 The Fourth Amendment requires that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST.
amend. IV. However, probable cause that the target has actually committed a
crime is not necessary. See United States v. Rahman, 861 F.Supp. 247, 251
(S.D.N.Y. 1994).
202 A "foreign power or its agent" includes entities controlled and directed by
foreign governments, such as their intelligence services, as well as groups
"engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation therefore." 50
U.S.C. § 1801(a)(4).
203 Id.
204 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e). Some critics, however, charge that the FISA Court
simply "rubber stamps" all foreign intelligence surveillance requests. In fact, the
FISA court has never denied an application for a search or surveillance, but this
is probably due to the fact that the "probable cause" standard is a relatively easy
one to meet. See Michael, supra note 180, at 24.
205 A United States person is defined as a United States citizen or "an alien
lawfully admitted for permanent residence." 50 U.S.C. § 1801(i).206ld. § 1801(e).
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Although FISA has been commonly associated with gathering
classic intelligence information, (e.g., investigating Soviet intelligence
agencies), it has also been an effective tool in the fight against terrorist
organizations and their individual cells or members 207 The USA Patriot
Act expands the range of terrorism-fighting tools available pursuant to
FISA, most notably its physical search and electronic surveillance
provisions.
1. Physical (Home) Searches
It is better sometimes that crime should go unpunished than that
the citizen should be liable to have his premises invaded, his
desks broken open, his private books, letters, and papers exposed
to prying curiosity ... of ignorant and suspicious persons.2°s
Prior to 1994, physical searches for intelligence information
were performed without review by the courts. Concerned that the 1993
warrantless physical search of the home of convicted spy Aldrich Ames
might have been challenged had Ames not pled guilty, Congress
amended FISA to permit physical searches.
20 9
Physical searches under FISA are subject to the same Fourth
Amendment probable cause requirement 210 that governs ordinary
criminal investigations. First, the government must meet a two-prong
inquiry, showing probable cause that: (1) the target of the physical search
is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, except that no United
States person may be considered an agent of a foreign power solely upon
the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the
Constitution of the United States; and (2) the premises or property to be
searched is owned, used, possessed by, or is in transit to or from an agent
of a foreign power or a foreign power.
211
207 Michael, supra note 187, at 24. FISA authorizes surveillance of groups or
individuals engaged or preparing to engage in terrorist activities. See Zachery,
supra note 74, at 296 n.3 1.
20 THOMAS G. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 367, 375
(4th ed. 1878).
209 Michael, supra note 187, at 23.
210 "[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
211 50 U.S.C. § 1824(a)(3).
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In determining whether or not probable cause exists for purposes
of a warrant, the FISA Court judge may consider past activities of the
target, as well as facts and circumstance relating to current or future
activities of the target'
212
The USA Patriot Act amends FISA's physical search provisions
in several ways. First, the USA Patriot Act extends the duration for
which an order approving a physical search is valid, from forty-five to
ninety days.213 Second, the Act allows a FISA warrant to be extended
"for a period not to exceed one year.' 214 Finally, the USA Patriot Act
adds "agents" of a foreign power to the FISA provision that allows
extensions of physical search orders against a "foreign power" for a
period not to exceed one year, if the judge finds probable cause to believe
that no property of any individual United States person will be acquired
during the period. 5
None of the foregoing amendments affects FISA's
constitutionality, which, although challenged on several fronts, has
consistently been upheld.216 Unsuccessful challenges included the
argument that there must be probable cause to believe that the target has
committed a crime,21 7 and the argument that FISA's provisions violate
the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against warrantless searches.
218
Because FISA was amended only minimally by the USA Patriot Act, it is
likely that the provisions of the Patriot Act in question pass constitutional
muster.219
2. Electronic Surveillance
The USA Patriot Act reduces the procedural hurdles to
government surveillance Authority2 20 For example, prior to passage of
212 Id. § 1824(b).
213 50 U.S.C. § 1824(d)(1), amended by USA Patriot Act § 207(a)(2).
214 USA Patriot Act § 207(b)(1).
215 50 U.S.C. § 1824(d)(2), amended by USA Patriot Act § 207(b)(2).
216 See Michael, supra note 187, at 24.
217 Although the gathering of foreign intelligence information must be the
primary purpose of a FISA warrant, the information gleaned can be used in a
criminal proceeding. Id. at 25.
218 FISA does in fact require the government to obtain warrants, although the
FISA court has never denied an application for a search or surveillance. Id. at
24.
219 d.220 See Plesser et al., supra note 46, at 9.
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the Act, FISA required the government to certify, for any electronic
surveillance request, that "the purpose of the surveillance is to obtain
foreign intelligence information. '' 22 Courts have interpreted this to mean
that the "primary purpose" of the surveillance must be gathering of
foreign intelligence. 2  Section 218 of the USA Patriot act amends FISA
so that the gathering of foreign intelligence need only be "a significant
purpose" of the surveillance.223 This will stave off arguments that if the
information is also used for a criminal investigation, all Fourth
Amendment protections should apply. In United States v. Pelton,224 in
which the defendant argued that the need for foreign intelligence did not
justify an exception to the warrant requirement, the court held that FISA
has numerous safeguards that provide sufficient protection under the 4th
Amendment. The court stated: "The governmental interests in gathering
foreign intelligence are of paramount importance to national security, and
may differ substantially from those presented in the normal criminal
investigation."2 5  In United States v. Rahman,226 the defendant was
convicted for his role as a supervisor of terrorist operations in the United
States, based in part on the use of FISA surveillance.?27 He argued that
because the FISA surveillance was expected to produce results for use in
a criminal case, the warrant should not have been certified.228 The court
dismissed this argument, refusing to "second-guess" the government's
certification. 229 The court noted that FISA specifically contemplated that
targets of surveillance would violate criminal laws.210 Accordingly, the
government is not precluded from using FISA when doing so would also
produce criminal evidence. 3 Section 204 of the USA Patriot Act
22 50 U.S.C. § 1804 (a)(7)(B).
222 See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 952 F.2d 565, 572 (1st Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 506 U.S. 816 (1992); United States v. Badia, 827 F.2d 1458, 1464 (11 th
Cir. 1987).
223 USA Patriot Act § 218 (2001). This language reflects a compromise between
existing law and a lower standard requested by the Bush administration. See
Plesser et al., supra note 46, at 5.
224 835 F.2d 1067, 1075 (4th Cir. 1987).
225 Id.
226 861 F.Supp. 247, 251 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), affirmed at 189 F.3d 88 (2nd Cir.
1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1094 (2000).
227 See id. at 249.
228 See id. at 251.
229 id.
230 See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(c)(1) & (d).
231 Rahman, 189 F.3d at 251.
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codifies these holdings, specifically exempting foreign intelligence
surveillance from criminal procedure protections.
2 2
The USA Patriot Act also amends FISA to allow roving
surveillance of particular individuals. The federal wiretap statute, but not
FISA, was amended fifteen years ago to allow "roving taps. 33 Prior to
amendment by the USA Patriot Act, FISA authorized electronic
surveillance of only a specifically identified facility, such as a telephone
or facsimile machine. 234 Section 206 of the USA Patriot Act expands
FISA's reach to authorize roving surveillance of particular individuals,
not just a particular telephone or computer.23  This will enable
investigators to intercept all of a suspect's wire or electronic
communications, regardless of his location. The "quintessential
situation" regarding a roving wiretap in the past has been when a suspect
"goes from phone booth to phone booth numerous times in an effort to
prevent his or her calls from being wiretapped. 36 Today, terrorists often
employ similarly evasive tactics, moving among various public Internet
caf6s or public library computer terminals in an effort to avoid being
tracked, 23' and utilizing "disposable" cell phones238 to prevent
interception of their calls.
The Act also expands the kinds of communications that may be
intercepted. Because FISA was passed over twenty years ago, in 1978, it
contemplated only wire or oral transmissions. The USA Patriot Act
brings FISA into the twenty-first century by including "electronic"
communications as well, allowing investigators to monitor and intercept
232 Plesser et al., supra note 46, at 2.
233 id.
234 See 50 U.S.C. § 1805(c)(2)(B).
235 USA Patriot Act § 206 (2001).
236 Plesser et al., supra note 6, at 2.
237 See, e.g., Randall E. Stross, A Web of Peace-or War?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Nov. 26, 2001, at 47, 2001 WL 30365714. "Roving tap authority ... could
be used to intercept the Intemet communications of a suspect who changes
Internet accounts daily, or several times a day." Plesser et al., supra note 44, at
2.
238 "[A] suspect buys one cell phone and a week later buys another cell phone
with a different number and moves from cell phone to cell phone seeking to
avoid interception." Id. at 2. See also Michael Goldsmith, Eavesdropping
Reform: The Legality of Roving Surveillance, 1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 401, 410
(1988) ("The success of electronic surveillance prompted experienced targets to
shift telephones continuously.").
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suspected terrorists' Internet communications. 239 Also, the Act makes
several changes to FISA's pen register2 40 and "trap and trace"
24
'
authority, most notably a provision that adds the terms "routing" and
"addressing" to the phrase "dialing and signaling information," clarifying
that pen register and trap and trace authority are intended to apply to
Internet communications as well as traditional oral and wire
communications.
242
The foregoing amendments to FISA by the USA Patriot Act seek
to bring FISA up-to-date by addressing many of the modem techniques
and technologies utilized by terrorists. None of the amendments-most
of which simply contemplate Internet communications and related
hardware (e.g., laptop computers) in addition to traditional oral and wire
communications and related hardware (e.g., telephones)-do not appear
to affect FISA's constitutionality in any way. FISA still contains
numerous safeguards that provide sufficient protection under the Fourth
Amendment, 243 and because it involves national security, "the
governmental interests in gathering foreign intelligence are of paramount
importance. ' 244  Thus, FISA's updated provisions, as amended by the
USA Patriot Act, pass constitutional muster.
239 USA Patriot Act § 204. The Act also expands the scope of items that may be
obtained to include "tangible things." Id. § 215. Thus, Internet
communications, records, and, now, items such as a computer on which
information is stored may all be obtained with a proper FISA warrant. See
Plesser et al., supra note 44, at 4. Seizure of tangible things is particularly
useful in terrorism investigations, where bomb plots, diagrams of potential
targets, and other documents may be stored on a suspect's computer but not
necessarily e-mailed to others. In one particularly important discovery, for
example, the convicted terrorist who masterminded the World Trade Center
bombing in 1993 had encrypted files on his laptop containing plans to blow up
U.S. airplanes around the world. See Hearing of the Senate Judiciary
Committee: Digital Privacy and the FBI's Carnivore Internet Surveillance
Program, FED. NEWS SERV., Sept. 6, 2000.
240 A pen register re cords the numbers dialed from a telephone. It does not
overhear oral communications and does not indicate whether calls are actually
completed. Smith v. Maryland., 442 U.S. 735, 736 (1979) (citing United States
v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 161 (1977)).
241 "Trap and trace" devices record the telephone numbers of the subject's
incoming calls. U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. F.B.I., 276 F.3d 620, 623 (2002).
242 Plesser et al., supra note 46, at 4.
243 United States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067, 1075 (4th Cir. 1987).
244 Id.
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VI. Conclusion
The principles enunciated in the Declaration of Independence,
the Constitution, acts of Congress, and court decisions historically seek
to maximize individual liberty and minimize abuse of individual rights
by the state.245 At the same time, Americans understand that our freedom
comes at a price, and that there are times of national emergency when
individual liberties must be subordinated to national security concerns.
246
The USA Patriot was passed at such a time. National security
commentators and experts had warned Americans for years that the
world's geopolitical climate exposed them to the threat of a serious
terrorist attack.247 This prediction was tragically realized on September
11, 2001, when terrorists used hijacked airplanes as missiles to attack the
United States, reminding the U.S. that it can no longer ignore the threat
terrorism poses to national security.
Throughout U.S. history, the American people have
demonstrated a willingness to accept extraordinary measures to ensure
national security.248 There are, of course, limits beyond which the U.S.
government should not go in the pursuit of national security. Those
limits remain unknown.
249
The USA Patriot Act strikes a reasonable balance between
national security and individual rights. It utilizes several means allowed
within the constitutional framework to prevent terrorism, without
unnecessarily encroaching on the liberties enjoyed by Americans. So
long as the Act commands the support of the American people, the
United States should utilize the tools contained therein to the fullest
extent possible to ensure national security and prevent further terrorist
attacks.
245 McShane, supra note 54, at 46.
246 id.
247 McShane, supra note 54, at 46.
248 See Volknan & Baggett, supra note 26, at 90-92.
249 McShane, supra note 54, at 49.
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Editorial Postscript
Two major developments have taken place since the writing of
this article. First, the U.S. Supreme Court declined, without comment, to
hear an appeal that the ACLU filed on behalf of people who are under
government surveillance pursuant to FISA Court warrants granted under
the USA Patriot Act. The Court's action does not constitute a ruling on
the merits. 250 Second, the draft of follow-up legislation to the USA
Patriot Act, entitled the "Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003,"
expands on several of the provisions of the Patriot Act, going so far in
some instances as to strip U.S. citizens of their citizenship if such
persons are involved in terrorist activity. Testifying before the Senate
Judiciary Committee on the parameters of the newAct, Attorney General
John Ashcroft noted, "It's in the country's interest that we think
expansively.
'251
250 Gina Holland, Court Rejects Challenge to U.S. Spy Tactics, MiAMI HERALD,
Mar. 25, 2003, available at
http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/2003/03/25/news/nation/5474293.htm.
251 Shannon McCaffrey, Diverse Groups Opposed to Broader Antiterror Powers,
MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 26, 2003, at Al.
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